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Abstract 
The gender pay gap generates significant political and social debate. This study contributes to 
this discussion by examining if a gender pay gap exists at the highest level of corporate 
management, the CEOs.  Whilst previous studies have documented a gender pay gap for most 
levels of executives the findings with respect to CEOs are conflicting. In this paper we focus 
only on CEO's as it is the most homogenous of executive roles and does not require us to 
assume that executives with similar titles undertake identical roles. Our evidence is based on 
291 US firm-years for the period of 1998-2010. We do not find any association between CEO 
pay and gender using both the total sample and a sample matched using propensity scores to 
control for firm characteristics. These insignificant results hold for total pay, salary and 
bonuses, and for different matching procedures and econometric specifications. Our results 
therefore indicate that women who rise through the "glass ceiling" to the level of CEO are 
remunerated at similar levels to their male counterparts. 
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In 2010 the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress reported that full-time female 
employees earned only 77 cents for every dollar earned by their male counterparts.1 A gender 
pay gap also exists for managers with the US Government Accounting Office indicating that 
in 2007 the average female manager’s salary was 81% of a male manager’s salary.2 A 
difference in pay across genders has also been documented in prior academic research (e.g. 
Bayard et al., 2003). 
Recent academic studies also support the proposition that there is a gender bias in executive 
pay. For example, the studies of Vieto and Khan (2012), Munoz-Bullon (2010), Bell, (2005) 
and Bertrand and Hallock (2001) provide evidence that there is a gender difference in 
executive pay and that male executives are compensated at higher levels than female 
executives. Bell (2005) also documents that the gender pay gap for female executives reduces 
when a firm is led by a female CEO. In a recent study, Elkinawy and Stater (2011) find that a 
gender gap exists in the compensation of lower level executives which has been diminishing 
for CEOs over time. On the other hand, Jordan et al. (2007) find no evidence of a gender pay 
gap for CEOs, only for lower level executives. We aim to build on these studies. 
The objective of this study is to focus on CEOs alone and to provide evidence on whether 
there is a gender gap in the total pay, salary and bonuses of male versus female CEOs. We 
focus only on CEOs because it is the most homogenous of all executive roles. Hence we do 
not need to define the different executive roles and assume that executives holding the same 
title across firms have the same responsibilities (Elkinawy and Stater, 2011; Bertrand and 
                                                 
1 Joint Economic Committee Releases Women and the Economy 2010: Top Ten Facts. Available at 
http://jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=5bdf6c24-2f48-463b-ae8a-
dabab6d25c20&ContentType_id=66d767ed-750b-43e8-b8cf-89524ad8a29e, date accessed 2 September, 2011. 
2 Government Accountability Office: Women in Management: Analysis of Female Managers’ Representation, 




Hallock, 2001). An additional advantage of our study is, that in comparison to prior studies 
examining whether CEO (as opposed to all executives) pay differs with gender, this study 
uses a larger and more recent sample of CEO firm-years than examined in prior research.3 
We also aim to take advantage of recent methodological developments within the executive 
compensation literature that enable us to match firms based on the most relevant 
characteristics. In doing so we can compare the compensation of CEOs from like firms, but 
who differ on their gender. To undertake this analysis we use propensity score matching to 
identify a control firm for each firm employing a female CEO. In previous studies, firms with 
a female CEO are typically only matched within industry to a similar sized firm employing a 
male CEO. As discussed by Armstrong et al. (2010), this partial-matching approach may lead 
to biased parameter estimates. The propensity score matching technique used in this study 
identifies control firms within year and industry using firm size (sales), board size and 
percentage of female directors as matching variables. We include the percentage of female 
directors as a control because previous research reports that firms are more likely to have 
female executives when the board comprises a greater proportion of female directors 
(Elkinawy and Stater, 2011, Bell, 2005). Our results indicate that the use of propensity score 
matching identifies control firms that are statistically similar across multiple dimensions to 
firms with a female CEO.  
Our evidence is based on an initial sample of 291 firm-years and a propensity score matched 
sample of 210 firm years of US publicly listed companies with female CEOs for the period 
1998-2010. Using the propensity score matched sample we find no difference in 
compensation between genders. This insignificant finding holds for total compensation, 
salary and bonus. Hence our result is consistent with the findings of Jordan et al. (2007), and 
                                                 
3 As a means of comparison the sample in Jordan, et al. (2007) comprises three CEOs between 2001 and 2003, 
whist Mohan and Ruggiero (2003) include 47 CEOs in 2000. 
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also extends prior academic research and informs the political and social debate on the 
existence of a gender pay gap for corporate executives. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant prior 
literature; Section 3 describes the research method; Section 4 presents descriptive statistics 
and a discussion of the sample; Section 5 presents results; and Section 6 concludes the study. 
2. Prior literature 
Most of the literature that addresses issues related to CEO compensation is based on agency 
theory; however agency theory does not provide any guidance on CEO compensation with 
respect to gender differences. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) offer an alternative theoretical 
perspective on CEO compensation in terms of board capture theory (recently referred to as 
managerial power theory). In this framework CEOs are able to capture the board and extract 
rents. However, this theoretical approach does not provide any conceptual insights into the 
association of CEO pay and gender, unless one can argue that female CEOs are better at 
capturing boards than their male counterparts.   
Prior empirical evidence on the association between gender and CEO compensation is also 
limited and the results from these studies are mixed. Jordan et al. (2007), using univariate 
analysis, document that the compensation of female CEOs of firms in the Fortune 100 is not 
significantly different from the compensation of male CEOs. However, this analysis is 
limited by the small sample size investigated. Mohan and Ruggiero (2003) compare pay for 
47 female CEOs in the year 2000 matched to firms employing a male CEO by size and 
industry, and find that female CEOs receive lower total compensation. However, this result is 
based on data envelopment analysis (DEA) used to project executives' compensation to the 
highest attainable level for any level of observed performance. No significant difference is 
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found in any of the compensation measures when using univariate analysis on their matched 
sample prior to DEA. 
Other studies examining the impact of gender on compensation investigate differences at the 
executive level, rather than focusing exclusively on the CEO.  For example, Elkinawy and 
Stater (2011) identify and codify eleven different senior executive positions including 
CEO/Chair for the period of 1992-2004. Their cross-sectional experimental design pools 
observations across these different executive levels and adds to the model certain firm and 
governance characteristics. Accordingly, their experimental design does not allow one to 
make inferences specifically about the association of CEO compensation and gender. It only 
derives some general conclusions about executives’ compensation and gender. The key 
finding is that an approximate five percent pay gap exists between male and female 
executives’ compensation. Vieto and Khan (2012) also report a gender pay gap for US 
executives using an identical time period to Elkinawy and Stater (2011).  
Similarly, Bell (2005) uses the Standard and Poor’s Execucomp Database to explore gender 
related pay differences for the top five executives in the US over the period 1992-2003.  The 
results indicate that female executives earn between 8 to 25% less than their male 
counterparts.  The study also reports that firms led by women have significantly greater 
numbers of female executives and that the disparity in pay between men and women 
executives decreases when the firm is led by a female.    
Since neither agency theory nor current empirical evidence help us to derive a formal 
prediction, we treat the association between CEO compensation and gender as an empirical 
issue and aim to provide the most rigorous evidence to date on this matter.  
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3. Sample and Data 
Data for US listed firms between 1998 and 2010 are collected from the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), Compustat Fundamentals Annual and Execucomp 
databases. Observations with missing CEO compensation data or data required to estimate 
model (1) are excluded from the sample. We also exclude nineteen observations with 
reported total CEO compensation of $0. As total compensation includes salary, bonus, stock 
options granted, restricted stock granted and all other compensation (both cash and non-cash), 
these observations are either data errors or represent unusual circumstances. The remaining 
sample comprises 14,759 firm-years. Panel A of Table 1 provides a yearly breakdown of 
firms and Panel B shows the frequency of firms with a female CEO classified by industry. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Panel A of Table 1 indicates that no single year dominates the sample. Across the sample 
period, female CEOs represent only 1.97% of firm years.  It is notable though that the 
percentage of firms with a female CEO has increased from 0.64% in 1998 to 3.30% in 2010.  
Female CEOs are employed most frequently in the consumer discretionary and consumer 
staples industries (Panel B). The industry with the lowest rate of employment of female 
CEOs is industrials. 
4. Research Method  
The following model is estimated to examine if CEO gender influences the level of CEO 
compensation: 
 Compi = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Fem_CEO + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 Governance characteristicsi  
  + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 CEO characteristicsi  + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 Economic characteristicsi  
  + ∑ 𝛽𝑚Industry Indicatorsi  + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 Year Indicatorsi + εi   (1) 
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The level of annual CEO compensation is used as the dependent variable (Comp). CEO 
compensation is measured using three alternative measures: total annual compensation, 
annual salary, and annual bonus. The natural logarithm of Execucomp's TDC1 is used to 
measure total annual compensation. Total compensation (Total_comp) includes the CEO's 
salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, total value 
of stock options granted (valued using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all 
other compensation (in thousands of dollars). The dollar value of the CEO's base salary (in 
thousands of dollars) is used as the measure of annual base compensation (Salary).4 The 
dollar value of the bonus awarded during the fiscal year is specified as the bonus (in 
thousands of dollars) (Bonus). The independent variable of interest is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the CEO is female (Fem_CEO). The remaining independent variables included 
in model (1) are identified from prior literature and provide controls for governance, CEO, 
and economic characteristics that are associated with CEO compensation. We also include 
industry and year indicators in model (1) to control for industry and year effects. 
4.1 Corporate governance controls 
We incorporate controls in model (1) for board size, the percentage of independent directors, 
and compensation committee independence. Board size (Bdsize) is included as a control as 
larger boards are expected to be less effective monitors (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). The 
second governance control is the percentage of the independent directors on the board 
(Inddirs%). If independent directors are more effective monitors they may act to constrain 
CEO compensation (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Coles et al., 2008). Alternatively, board capture 
theory suggests that independent directors do not always seek to maximize returns for 
shareholders (e.g. Core et al., 1999) and may result in greater CEO compensation. The final 
                                                 
4 The results are unchanged if the natural logarithm of 1+salary is used as the dependent variable. 
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governance control variable is an indicator variable (Indcompcom) equal to one if the 
compensation committee is comprised wholly of independent directors. 
4.2 CEO characteristics 
The CEO characteristics included in model (1) are controls for CEO managerial power and 
experience. CEO’s that have a longer tenure with the firm are expected to exert greater 
influence over the board. We control for CEO tenure using the natural logarithm of the 
number of years of service of the current CEO (Log(CEO_tenure)). The next control is an 
indicator variable equal to one which identifies if the CEO is also the board chairperson 
(CEO_chair). It is expected that CEOs receive higher compensation when they also act as the 
board chairperson due to their greater influence over the board (Bebchuk et al., 2002; 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). The compensation of CEOs in their 
first year of appointment at a firm may be atypical due to sign-on bonuses or the use of 
performance incentives that will not be realised until future years. This effect is controlled for 
through the use of an indicator variable equal to one if it is the CEO's first year of service at a 
firm (CEO_firstyear). The final control is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO owns 
5% or more of the company's stock (CEO5pct). CEO’s with greater ownership have more 
personal wealth tied to firm performance and hence are less likely to extract rents through 
remuneration. 
4.3 Economic controls 
Consistent with previous studies, controls are included for economic characteristics of the 
firm that will influence compensation. Because compensation is used as an incentive to 
improve performance, controls are measured one year prior to the year compensation is 
awarded (year t-1). Due to greater complexity and responsibility, larger firms pay their 
executives more than smaller firms (Smith and Watts, 1992) hence the natural logarithm of 
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sales revenue is used as a control for size (Log(Sale)). Murphy (1985) finds that CEO 
compensation is higher for companies with greater investment opportunities. We use a firms' 
book-to-market ratio (BMV) as a measure of their investment opportunities. Core et al. (1999) 
show that executive pay is a function of firm performance. We control for firm performance 
using both an accounting and market performance measure. The market measure is a 
company’s annual common stock return (RET) and the accounting measure is return on assets 
(ROA). Similar to previous studies we control for firm risk using the standard deviation of 
common stock returns (Log(Std3RET)) and the standard deviation of return on assets 
measured over the previous three years (Log(Std3ROA)).5 Core et al. (1999) find a negative 
association between risk and CEO compensation. 
5. Results 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the total pooled sample partitioned by gender.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on the medians of the variables of both groups reports that, 
on average, male CEOs receive a higher bonus but there is no difference in total 
compensation. The mean and median salary for female CEOs is higher than male CEOs but 
the difference is insignificant. These findings are similar to those documented for executives 
by Munoz-Bullon (2010) and Elkinawy and Stater (2011). Consistent with Bell (2005) and 
Elkinawy and Stater (2011), a female CEO is more likely to be employed when the board 
comprises more female directors. Firms with female CEOs are significantly smaller in size 
and have fewer directors on the board. Male CEOs have a significantly longer tenure than 
female CEOs and are significantly more likely to be board chairperson. Firms headed by a 
                                                 
5 The natural logarithm of these measures is used due to the positively skewed distribution.  Our results are 
unchanged if we use the standard deviation of returns over the previous five years as a control for risk.  Using 
this longer time period however results in a reduction in the sample size. 
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female CEO have significantly lower leverage.  The standard deviation of ROA and annual 
stock returns does not statistically differ between male and female CEOs. There is also no 
difference across the gender of CEOs in either the accounting or stock market measures of 
performance. 
As there is a large disparity in numbers of male and female CEO firm years, we conduct our 
main analysis of a difference in CEO pay between the genders using a matched sample. Prior 
literature examining gender pay differences for executives and CEOs has typically selected a 
matched firm of similar size within the same industry. As discussed by Armstrong et al. 
(2010), this partial-matching approach will potentially produce biased parameter estimates. 
We therefore follow the approach suggested by Armstrong et al. (2010) and identify matched 
firms using a propensity score procedure.6 The probability of a firm having a female CEO is 
modelled within a year using a logit regression with firm size (Sale), board size (Bdsize) and 
percentage of female directors (Fem-dirs%) as the independent variables. We include the 
percentage of female directors as a control because previous research shows that the number 
of males on the board is negatively related to the employment of female executives.  Using 
the results from this logit model we match within industry each firm led by a female CEO to 
a firm headed by a male CEO with the lowest difference in propensity scores.7  For 81 CEO 
firm years it was not possible to identify a reasonable propensity score match resulting in the 
sample being reduced to 210 CEO firm years. The use of propensity score matching controls 
for self-selection bias arising from the observable characteristics included in the first stage 
logit model.8  
                                                 
6 See Rosenbaum (2001) for an overview of the process of propensity score matching and Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) for a theoretical discussion. 
7 The match used is a calibre match where the control and treatment firm’s propensity score are allowed to differ 
by up to 0.10. 
8 As propensity score matching assumes self-selection only arises from the observable characteristics included 
in the first-stage model it does not control for unobservable characteristics (Li and Prabhala, 2007 and Lennox, 
et al., 2012). The alternative Heckman (1979) method requires the use of theory to identify instrumental 
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The results of estimating the logit regressions which are used to match firms with male and 
female CEOs are provided in Table 3. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Similar to the results in Bell (2005) and Elkinawy and Stater (2011) firms are significantly 
more likely to have a female CEO when there are a higher percentage of female directors on 
the board.  Board size is significantly negatively associated with the probability of having a 
female CEO in seven of the 13 years.  In all years firm size is unrelated to the likelihood of 
hiring a female CEO. 
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics for the paired subsample and univariate tests of 
differences between male and female CEO firms. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
By construction no difference (in level or magnitude) is evident in Sale, Bdsize or Fem_dirs% 
between male and female CEO firms. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test reports no 
difference in any of the compensation measures between male and female CEOs. The average 
and median total compensation are lower for female CEOs but the differences are not 
significantly different. Note the median bonus for both male and female CEOs is zero. A 
comparison of the other governance, CEO and economic controls across gender indicates 
there are no significant differences other than for CEO_tenure, CEO_chair and 
CEO_firstyear. The similarity of control variables across gender indicates that the propensity 
score matching procedure has been successful in matching firms with male and female CEOs 
across multiple dimensions. 
                                                                                                                                                        
variables for the first-stage model that can be validly excluded in the second stage (Li and Prabhala, 2007 and 
Lennox, et al., 2012).  As theory does not guide us in the choice of instrumental variables, we have chosen the 
propensity score matching approach. 
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Table 5 reports the results for estimating the regression model for the full sample. We cluster 
standard errors by firm to control for firm fixed effects (because it is possible for the same 
firm to enter the pooled sample a number of times).  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
As the adjusted R-squared for the total compensation and salary models are above 41%, the 
model has reasonable explanatory power. The coefficient on the experimental variable 
Fem_CEO is insignificant for total compensation and bonus but positive and significant for 
salary. The significant positive coefficient on salary for female CEOs is consistent with the 
higher mean and median salary reported in Table 2. The results based on the total sample are 
inconclusive, not unlike previous studies and highlights the need for careful matching. 
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with previous studies (see for 
example Core et al., 1999; and Chalmers et al., 2006). CEOs with a longer tenure receive 
significantly higher salary and bonus, but there is no difference for total compensation. For 
all three compensation measures CEOs who are also chairperson receive significantly more 
pay. This may be interpreted as CEOs using their power to extract greater pay, or it may 
reflect additional talent or effort. In the first year of employment CEOs receive significantly 
lower salary and significantly higher total compensation and bonus pay. Firms in which the 
CEO owns more than 5% of stock are paid significantly less. This finding can be explained 
by agency costs: CEOs with lower ownership are more likely to extract higher pay 
inconsistent with maximizing shareholder wealth. As expected, smaller firms and those with 
less growth options (as measured by the book-to-market ratio) remunerate their CEOs less. 
The relationship between firm stock performance and remuneration is positive for CEO 
bonus and total pay. A higher ROA increases bonus but surprisingly is negatively related to 
salary. The impact of firm risk on total compensation and salary is generally positive, 
although a significant negative relationship is shown between salary and the standard 
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deviation of returns. The significant results on the corporate governance measures are 
generally positive and indicate that salary and total compensation increases with board size 
and total compensation increases with the percentage of independent directors. An 
independent compensation committee is unrelated to CEO remuneration. Overall, the results 
for the corporate governance measures are similar to those in prior literature (e.g. Wade et al., 
1990; Core et al., 1999) and are consistent with board capture theory suggesting that 
independent directors do not necessarily seek to maximize shareholder wealth (Bebchuk and 
Weisbach, 2009). 
Table 6 presents the results of estimating model (1) using the propensity score matched 
subsample.9  
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
The adjusted R-squared for total compensation is 45% but increases to 50% for salary. The 
coefficient on Fem_CEO is insignificant for all measures of compensation. This finding 
indicates that if firms with a male and female CEO are appropriately matched, the gender pay 
gap does not exist. A comparison with Table 5 indicates that fewer of the control variables 
attain significance. However, those controls that are significant provide results that are 
generally consistent with those reported in Table 5. It is notable though that board size is 
insignificant. This is potentially explained by this variable being used to match female and 
male CEO firms reducing the dispersion of the data for this variable entering the regression.  
Also, using the matched sample the independent compensation committee dummy variable is 
positive and significant for total compensation.  
As an additional analysis we analyze if our results are robust to including as additional 
variables in regression model (1) the percentage of female directors on the board (Femdirs%) 
                                                 
9 The reported results do not include controls for firm fixed effects because the majority of the matched sample 
comprises unique firms. As a check we re-estimate model (1) on the matched sample including firm fixed 
effects and results are unchanged. 
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or an indicator variable indicating the presence of a female on the compensation committee 
(Femcompcomp).10  The findings from estimating this extended version of the regression 
model are presented in Table 7 using the propensity score matched sample. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
Consistent with the findings disclosed in Table 6 we find no pay disparity between male and 
female CEOs.  The results indicate that CEO salary is negatively associated with both the 
percentage of females on the board and having a compensation committee comprising one or 
more female directors.  The indictor variable highlighting female representation on the 
compensation committee is also inversely related to total CEO compensation.  Our results 
stand in contrast to Adams and Ferreira (2009) who report no relationship between the 
percentage of board members that are female and total or incentive-based CEO pay.11 
5.1 Sensitivity testing and additional analysis 
5.1.1 Alternative matching methods 
There may be doubts that the percentage of female directors on the board influences the 
hiring of a female CEO, hence we repeat the propensity score matching procedure using only 
firm size and board size to match female CEO firms to male CEO firms. Regression model 
(1) was then estimated using this alternate matched sample. The conclusions from the results 
were consistent with those shown in Table 6. We also use an alternative and less rigorous 
matching procedure by ranking firms based on size (Sale) within industry and year. We 
match firms with a female CEO to firms with a male CEO of the next highest rank (i.e. male 
CEO firms will be the same or slightly larger in size). This matching procedure allows certain 
                                                 
10 These variables are included alternatively in estimating the model due to the high degree of multicollinearity 
between the variables. 
11 Our findings are not directly comparable to the results in Adams and Ferreira (2009) as that study does not 
control for CEO gender in their regression models.  Furthermore, their regression results are estimated on a 
broad sample of CEO firm years, whilst our results are based on a narrow sample of propensity score matched 
female and male CEO firm years. 
15 
 
firm and CEO characteristics to vary between the matched firms; such as CEO tenure, 
stockholdings and the percentage of female directors on the board. Using this less rigourous 
approach results in the Fem_CEO variable being positive and significant at the 5% level for 
total compensation and salary, but not bonus. However, no difference is reported in univariate 
tests of the three compensation measures. These results indicate that the matching procedures 
of prior research may be responsible for the erroneous conclusion that a gender gap exists in 
CEO pay. 
Alternative specifications of model (1) 
Kulich et al. (2011) find that in the UK there is a higher pay for performance sensitivity for 
male executives than female executives. To examine if a similar relationship exists for female 
CEOs in the US, we introduce into regression model (1) an interaction variable between 
Fem_CEO and both the stock return (RET) and accounting measure (ROA) of performance. 
These interaction variables are insignificant and the remaining results are unchanged from 
those reported in Table 6. Prior studies on the relation between gender and compensation 
have included CEO age as a proxy for experience (Mohan and Ruggiero 2003). CEO age is a 
noisy proxy for experience and should not be related to the level of CEO compensation. 
While it may influence the hiring of a particular CEO, the compensation thereafter should be 
a function of firm performance and other economic characteristics. Nevertheless, we include 
CEO age in our regressions as a sensitivity test. The descriptive statistics on the total sample 
show that on average male CEOs are significantly older than female CEOs (by 3 years); 
however, there is no significant difference in mean age for the propensity score matched 
sample. These results indicate that female CEOs are not taking longer to climb the corporate 
ladder as suggested in the press and in prior gender-pay literature. The results of estimating 
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model (1) including the CEO age variable do not change for both the total sample and 
matched sample.12 
6. Conclusion 
A gender pay gap for executives, CEOs and other employees is a subject that attracts the 
attention of media, government, advocate groups and academics. This study examines 
whether a gender pay gap exists for US CEOs using a much larger sample than studied in 
prior research. Furthermore, we use propensity score matching to provide a better matched 
control firm for those firms employing a female CEO. Our results indicate that there is no 
difference in total pay, salary or bonus for female CEOs. These findings show that if women 
are able to climb the corporate ladder to the very top, they face no gender bias in pay. The 
insignificant difference in bonuses paid to CEOs across the genders is inconsistent with the 
suggestion, at least for CEOs, that women are risk-averse and will be reluctant to accept 
performance-based compensation. Our results will be of interest to regulators, academics and 
the wider professional community. As an extension of our study, future research may 
consider examining whether a gender-pay gap exists at specific executive levels below the 
CEO (e.g. CFO’s).  Furthermore, as our study is limited by the small sample of female CEO 
firm years, with the passage of time subsequent research can examine whether a gender pay 
gap exists using a longer time series of data. 
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Table 1 Sample by Year and Industry  
Panel A: Frequency of firms and female CEOs by year  




1998 786 5 0.64  
1999 1,042 9 0.86  
2000 1,082 13 1.20  
2001 1,139 15 1.32  
2002 1,161 19 1.64  
2003 1,181 19 1.61  
2004 1,195 19 1.59  
2005 1,207 20 1.66  
2006 1,194 26 2.18  
2007 1,061 32 3.02  
2008 1,142 32 2.80  
2009 1,234 38 3.08  
2010 1,335 44 3.30  
Total 14,759 291 1.97  
Panel B: Frequency of firms and female CEOs by industry  






Energy 800 5.42 6 0.75 
Materials 1,087 7.36 10 0.92 
Industrials 2,316 15.69 10 0.43 
Consumer Discretionary 2,629 17.81 101 3.84 
Consumer Staples 811 5.49 33 4.07 
Health Care 1,615 10.94 39 2.41 
Financials 1,923 13.03 24 1.25 
Information Technology 2,587 17.53 54 2.09 
Telecommunications 138 0.94 3 2.17 
Utilities 853 5.78 11 1.29 








Table 2 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of difference between male and female CEO firms using the total 
sample 
 
Male CEOs firms  
(N = 14,468) 
Female CEO firms  
(N = 291) 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Z P > |Z| 
Total comp 5503.50 3,124.54 5,447.38 3,066.74 -0.29 0.77 
Salary 736.58 691.30 780.41 700.00 0.53 0.59 
Bonus 650.63 167.40 345.98 0.00 -4.79*** 0.00 
Femdirs% 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.25 16.64*** 0.00 
Bdsize 9.54 9.00 8.80 8.00 -4.10*** 0.00 
Inddirs% 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.75 3.46*** 0.00 
Indcompcom 0.82 1.00 0.88 1.00 2.78*** 0.01 
CEO_tenure 7.18 5.00 5.32 3.00 -5.31*** 0.00 
CEO_chair 0.61 1.00 0.55 1.00 -2.30** 0.02 
CEO_firstyear 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 2.79*** 0.01 
CEO5pct 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.00 -1.14 0.25 
Sale 5,926.40 1,478.38 6,263.54 947.49 -2.90*** 0.00 
BMV 0.52 0.43 0.53 0.44 0.89 0.37 
DE 2.40 1.27 2.46 0.96 -3.85*** 0.00 
RET 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.18 0.86 
ROA 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.89 0.37 
Std3RET 0.71 0.31 0.39 0.32 0.30 0.77 
Std3ROA 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 1.60 0.11 
Total comp equals Execucomp's TDC1, which comprises the CEO's salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock 
granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total (in thousands of dollars). 
Salary is the dollar value of the CEO's base salary (in thousands of dollars). Bonus is the dollar value of bonus earned during the fiscal year 
(in thousands of dollars). Femdirs% is the fraction of directors that are female. Bdsize represents the number of directors on the board. 
Inddirs% is the fraction of directors that are independent. Indcompcom.is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the compensation committee is 
comprised wholly of independent members, 0 otherwise. CEO_tenure is the number of years of service of the current CEO. CEO_chair is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board, 0 otherwise. CEO_firstyear is an indicator variable equal to 1 if it is 
the CEO's first year at that firm, 0 otherwise. CEO5pct is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO owns five percent or more of the 
company's shares. Sale represents gross sales reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, returned sales and allowances for which credit is 
given to customers (measured in millions of dollars). BMV (book to market value) is measured as total common equity divided by market 
value (measured in millions of dollars). DE equals average total liabilities divided by average total assets (in millions of dollars). RET is the 
annual stock return. ROA is the annual return on assets (EBIT/avgAT). Std3RET and Std3ROA represent the three year standard deviation 




Table 3 Logit regressions (Fem_CEO = 1) for Propensity-Score Matching Each Year 
Year Intercept Fem_dirs% Bdsize Sales 
1998 -4.61 10.11 -0.13 -0.00 
 (5.41)** (9.12)*** (0.39) (0.43) 
1999 -2.85 15.08 -0.35 -0.00 
 (2.98)* (24.81)*** (2.63) (2.52) 
2000 -3.51 13.02 -0.32 0.00 
 (7.34)*** (30.94)*** (4.85)** (0.18) 
2001 -2.19 13.70 -0.49 0.00 
 (3.17)* (36.95)*** (9.58)*** (0.02) 
2002 -3.36 12.70 -0.29 0.00 
 (9.66)*** (38.69)*** (5.62)** (0.05) 
2003 -2.52 13.74 -0.44 0.00 
 (4.62)** (39.92)*** (9.45)*** (0.53) 
2004 -3.53 13.07 -0.31 0.00 
 (9.07)*** (38.41)*** (5.97)** (0.04) 
2005 -4.58 14.40 -0.18 -0.00 
 (13.55)*** (42.37)*** (1.72) (2.27) 
2006 -3.96 12.60 -0.19 -0.00 
 (13.30)*** (42.83)*** (2.61) (1.19) 
2007 -3.36 9.83 -0.18 -0.00 
 (14.26)*** (38.34)*** (3.54)* (0.00) 
2008 -4.89 12.49 -0.09 -0.00 
 (27.07)*** (48.40)*** (0.86) (0.06) 
2009 -5.06 14.32 -0.11 -0.00 
 (31.80)*** (65.37)*** (1.56) (0.05) 
2010 -4.37 13.45 -0.16 0.00 
 (26.26)*** (75.37)*** (3.65)* (0.02) 
Fem_dirs% is the fraction of directors that are female. Bdsize represents the number of directors on the board. Sale is gross sales (in $mil) 
reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers. Chi-Square statistics are 




Table 4 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of difference between male and female CEO firms using matched 
subsample 
 
Male CEOs firms 
(N = 210) 
Female CEO firms 
(N = 210) 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Z P > |Z| 
Total comp 4,811.62 3,147.60 4,586.74 2,761.51 1.17 0.24 
Salary 725.25 675.01 733.98 647.50 0.97 0.33 
Bonus 276.63 0.00 288.29 0.00 -0.49 0.62 
Fem_dirs% 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 -0.16 0.88 
Bdsize 8.57 8.00 8.75 8.00 -0.09 0.93 
Inddirs% 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.29 0.77 
Indcompcom 0.85 1.00 0.88 1.00 -0.85 0.40 
CEO_tenure 6.41 5.00 5.89 3.50 3.13*** 0.00 
CEO_chair 0.59 1.00 0.50 0.50 1.76* 0.08 
CEO_firstyear 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.70* 0.09 
CEO5pct 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 -0.73 0.46 
Sale 3,805.84 863.98 4,050.15 730.65 0.58 0.56 
BMV 0.53 0.40 0.53 0.45 -1.36 0.17 
DE 1.98 1.01 2.93 0.94 1.17 0.24 
RET 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.58 0.56 
ROA 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.17 0.24 
Std3RET 0.43 0.32 0.41 0.33 -0.19 0.85 
Std3ROA 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.85 
Total comp equals Execucomp's TDC1, which comprises the CEO's salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock 
granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total (in thousands of dollars). 
Salary is the dollar value of the CEO's base salary (in thousands of dollars). Bonus is the dollar value of bonus earned during the fiscal year 
(in thousands of dollars). Fem_dirs% is the fraction of directors that are female. Fem_dirs% is the fraction of directors that are female. 
Bdsize represents the number of directors on the board. Inddirs% is the fraction of directors that are independent. Indcompcom. is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the compensation committee is comprised wholly of independent members, 0 otherwise. CEO_tenure is the 
number of years of service of the current CEO. CEO_chair is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board, 0 
otherwise. CEO_firstyear is an indicator variable equal to 1 if it is the CEO's first year at that firm, 0 otherwise. CEO5pct is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the CEO owns five percent or more of the company's shares. Sale represents gross sales reduced by cash discounts, 
trade discounts, returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers (measured in millions of dollars). BMV (book to 
market value) is measured as total common equity divided by market value (measured in millions of dollars). DE equals average total 
liabilities divided by average total assets (in millions of dollars). RET is the annual stock return. ROA is the annual return on assets 
(EBIT/avgAT). Std3RET and Std3ROA represent the three year standard deviation of RET and ROA respectively. *** is significant at 1%, 






Table 5 Pooled cross-sectional regression on total CEO sample (N = 14,759) 
Comp = Fem_CEO +  Bdsize + Inddirs% + Indcompcom + Log(CEO_tenure) + CEO_chair + CEO_firstyear + CEO5pct + Log(Sale) + 
BMV + DE + RET + ROA + Log(Std3RET) + Log(Std3ROA) +  Industry Indicators + Year Indicators 
Parameter Total comp Salary Bonus (tobit) 
Intercept 4.46*** -545.97*** -5255.49*** 
 
(33.11) (-10.04) (-22.78) 
Fem_CEO 0.09 64.16** -74.69 
 
1.40 (2.34) (-0.48) 
Bdsize 0.01* 18.61*** -2.91 
 
(1.75) (5.46) (-0.30) 
Inddirs% 0.28*** -1.30 -971.41*** 
 
(2.84) (-0.03) (-6.10) 
Indcompcom 0.02 11.78 84.93 
 
(0.68) (1.02) (1.47) 
Log(CEO_tenure) 0.03 31.13*** 195.62*** 
 
(1.55) (3.80) (6.38) 
CEO_chair 0.20*** 71.01*** 166.92*** 
 
(6.30) (7.46) (3.61) 
CEO_firstyear 0.11*** -79.44*** 247.91*** 
 
(2.81) (-6.28) (2.65) 
CEO5pct -0.43*** -52.64*** -425.35*** 
 
(-7.51) (-2.64) (-5.41) 
Log(Sale) 0.40*** 138.31*** 390.51*** 
 
(26.13) (22.33) (22.84) 
BMV -0.40*** -34.05*** -120.63* 
 
(-12.27) (-2.81) (-1.86) 
DE -0.00 -2.71* 25.26*** 
 
(-0.23) (-1.67) (4.24) 
RET 0.14*** 2.89 310.96*** 
 
(8.01) (0.54) (6.56) 
ROA -0.10 -185.75*** 625.02** 
 
(-0.62) (-3.34) (2.38) 
Log(Std3RET) 0.20*** -5.58** -77.06 
 
(3.91) (-0.34) (-0.78) 
Log(Std3ROA) 0.80** 191.99* -462.60 
 
(2.07) (1.77) (-0.70) 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared .4168 .4527  




Censored values     6,231 
This table presents results of pooled cross-sectional regressions for the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation, dollar value of salary, and tobit regression for the log of 1 + bonus.  We control for firm fixed effects by clustering standard errors by firm. Total comp equals Execucomp's TDC1, which 
comprises the CEO's salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), 
long-term incentive payouts, and all other total (in thousands of dollars). Salary is the dollar value of the CEO's base salary (in thousands of dollars). Bonus is 
the dollar value of bonus earned during the fiscal year (in thousands of dollars). Bdsize represents the number of directors on the board. Inddirs% is the fraction 
of directors that are independent.Indcompcom is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the compensation committee is comprised wholly of independent members, 0 
otherwise. CEO_tenure is the number of years of service of the current CEO. CEO_chair is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the 
board, 0 otherwise. CEO_firstyear is an indicator variable equal to 1 if it is the CEO's first year at that firm, 0 otherwise. CEO5pct is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the CEO owns five percent or more of the company's shares. Sale represents gross sales reduced by cash discounts, trade discounts, returned sales and 
allowances for which credit is given to customers (measured in millions of dollars). BMV (book to market value) is measured as total common equity divided by 
market value (measured in millions of dollars). DE equals average total liabilities divided by average total assets (in millions of dollars). RET is the annual stock 




Table 6 Pooled cross-sectional regression on matched CEO subsample (N = 420) 
Comp = Fem_CEO + Bdsize + Inddirs% + Indcompcom + Log(CEO_tenure) + CEO_chair + CEO_firstyear + CEO5pct + Log(Sale) + BMV + DE + RET + 
ROA + Log(Std3RET) + Log(Std3ROA) + Industry Indicators + Year Indicators 
Parameter Total comp Salary Bonus (tobit) 
Intercept 5.31*** -340.94*** -0.15 
 
(12.74) (2.68) (-0.05) 
Fem_CEO 0.04 27.75 0.69 
 
(0.54) (1.15) (1.31) 
Bdsize 0.03 14.50 -0.27 
 
(1.17) (1.64) (-1.37) 
Inddirs% -0.24 -50.81 -3.81 
 
(-0.65) (-0.45) (-1.58) 
Indcompcom 0.25* -13.35 -0.14 
 
(1.76) (-0.31) (-0.16) 
Log(CEO_tenure) 0.10 31.05 -0.21 
 
(1.38) (1.46) (-0.46) 





CEO_firstyear 0.01 -88.02 0.06 
 
(0.06) (-1.61) (0.06) 
CEO5pct -0.46** 15.17 -3.55*** 
 
(-2.58) (0.28) (-2.83) 
Log(Sale) 0.38*** 140.94*** 0.01 
 
(9.38) (11.30) (0.03) 
BMV -0.32*** -33.26 0.96 
 
(-3.10) (-1.07) (1.39) 
DE -0.00 -0.35 -0.09 
 
(-1.06) (-0.26) (-1.29) 
RET 0.12* 5.90 0.98** 
 
(1.69) (0.27) (2.11) 
ROA 0.07 -28.25 3.60 
 
(0.17) (-0.23) (1.65) 
Log(Std3RET) -0.03 -6.82 0.18 
 
(-0.57) (-0.47) (0.56) 
Log(Std3ROA) 0.06 4.18 0.02 
 
(1.43) (0.31) (0.08) 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-squared .4454 .4993 







This table presents results of pooled cross-sectional regressions for the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation, dollar value of salary, and tobit regression 
for the log of 1 + bonus. 120 male CEO firms are matched to 120 female CEO firms (within year and industry) using a propensity score procedure. Total comp 
equals Execucomp's TDC1, which comprises the CEO's salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock 
options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total (in thousands of dollars). Salary is the dollar value of the CEO's base 
salary (in thousands of dollars). Bonus is the dollar value of bonus earned during the fiscal year (in thousands of dollars). Bdsize represents the number of 
directors on the board. Inddirs% is the fraction of directors that are independent.  Indcompcomis an indicator variable equal to 1 if the compensation committee 
is comprised wholly of independent members, 0 otherwise. CEO_tenure is the number of years of service of the current CEO. CEO_chair is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board, 0 otherwise. CEO_firstyear is an indicator variable equal to 1 if it is the CEO's first year at that firm, 0 
otherwise. CEO5pct is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO owns five percent or more of the company's shares. Sale represents gross sales reduced by 
cash discounts, trade discounts, returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers (measured in millions of dollars). BMV (book to market 
value) is measured as total common equity divided by market value (measured in millions of dollars). DE equals average total liabilities divided by average total 
assets (in millions of dollars). RET is the annual stock return. ROA is the annual return on assets (EBIT/avgAT). Std3RET and Std3ROA represent the three 




Table 7 Pooled cross-sectional regression on matched CEO subsample (N = 420) 
Comp = Fem_CEO +  Fem_dirs%(or Femcompcom) + Bdsize + Inddirs% + Indcompcom + Log(CEO_tenure) + CEO_chair + 
CEO_firstyear + CEO5pct + Log(Sale) + BMV + DE + RET + ROA + Log(Std3RET) + Log(Std3ROA) +  Industry Indicators + Year 
Indicators 
Parameter Totalcomp Salary Bonus(Tobit) Totalcomp Salary Bonus(Tobit) 
Intercept 5.32*** -295.63** -0.17 5.37*** -310.76** 0.02 
 (12.54) (2.29) (-0.06) (12.90) (-2.45) (0.01) 
Fem_CEO 0.04 28.81 0.69 -0.01 0.56 0.51 
 (0.55) (1.20) (1.31) (-0.20) (0.02) (0.89) 
Fem_dirs% -0.08 -314.71** 0.15    
 (-0.15) (-1.94) (0.04)    
Femcompcomp    -0.17* -78.91*** -0.52 
    (-1.90) (-2.83) (-0.85) 
Bdsize 0.03 14.50 -0.27 0.04 18.03** -0.25 
 (1.17) (1.64) (-1.37) (1.43) (2.03) (-1.26) 
Inddirs% -0.23 -37.59 -3.82 -0.19 -28.28 -3.60 
 (-0.63) (-0.33) (-1.57) (-0.51) (-0.25) (-1.48) 
Indcompcom 0.25* -14.48 -0.14 0.25* -12.50 -0.15 
 (1.76) (-0.33) (-0.16) (1.78) (-0.29) (-0.17) 
Log(CEO_tenure) 0.10 30.58 -0.21 0.08 24.90 -0.26 
 (1.38) (1.45) (-0.46) (1.18) (1.18) (-0.55) 
CEO_chair 0.03 57.51** 0.70 0.03 58.84** 0.71 
 (0.34) (1.99) (1.10) (0.35) (2.05) (1.13) 
CEO_firstyear 0.01 -88.44 0.06 0.02 -84.53 0.09 
 (0.06) (-1.62) (0.05) (0.10) (-1.56) (0.08) 
CEO5pct -0.46** 17.87 -3.55*** -0.45*** 14.69 -3.58*** 
 (-2.57) (0.33) (-2.83) (-2.60) (0.27) (-2.85) 
Log(Sale) 0.38*** 144.94*** 0.01 0.38*** 141.27*** 0.01 
 (9.27) (11.51) (0.02) (9.43) (11.43) (0.05) 
BMV -0.31*** -30.20 0.95 -0.31*** -31.68 0.97 
 (-3.08) (-0.97) (1.39) (-3.07) (-1.03) (1.42) 
DE -0.00 -0.51 -0.09 -0.00 -0.16 -0.09 
 (-1.07) (-0.38) (-1.28) (-0.97) (-0.12) (-1.29) 
RET 0.12* 4.34 0.98** 0.12* 7.29 0.99** 
 (1.68) (0.20) (2.11) (1.74) (0.34) (2.13) 
ROA 0.07 -17.53 3.60 0.05 -36.29 3.51 
 (0.17) (-0.14) (1.34) (0.12) (-0.30) (1.31) 
Log(Std3RET) -0.03 -7.95 0.18 -0.02 -2.98 0.19 
 (-0.58) (-0.55) (0.56) (-0.40) (-0.21) (0.62) 
Log(Std3ROA) 0.06 5.01 0.02 0.06 4.23 0.03 
 (1.43) (0.38) (0.08) (1.44) (0.32) (0.11) 
Industry 
Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-squared .4440 .5029  .4491 .5083  
F value 10.29*** 12.77***  10.49*** 13.03***  
Sigma   4.43***   4.43*** 
Censored values   241   241 
This table presents results of pooled cross-sectional regressions for the natural logarithm of CEO total compensation, dollar value of salary, and tobit regression 
for the log of 1 + bonus. 120 male CEO firms are matched to 120 female CEO firms (within year and industry) using a propensity score procedure. Total comp 
equals Execucomp's TDC1, which comprises the CEO's salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock 
options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total (in thousands of dollars). Salary is the dollar value of the CEO's base 
salary (in thousands of dollars). Bonus is the dollar value of bonus earned during the fiscal year (in thousands of dollars). Fem_dirs% is the fraction of directors 
that are female. Femcompcomp is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a female is represented on the compensation committee. Bdsize represents the number of 
directors on the board. Inddirs% is the fraction of directors that are independent. Indcompcom. is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the compensation committee 
is comprised wholly of independent members, 0 otherwise. CEO_tenure is the number of years of service of the current CEO. CEO_chair is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board, 0 otherwise. CEO_firstyear is an indicator variable equal to 1 if it is the CEO's first year at that firm, 0 
otherwise. CEO5pct is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO owns five percent or more of the company's shares. Sale represents gross sales reduced by 
cash discounts, trade discounts, returned sales and allowances for which credit is given to customers (measured in millions of dollars). BMV (book to market 
value) is measured as total common equity divided by market value (measured in millions of dollars). DE equals average total liabilities divided by average total 
assets (in millions of dollars). RET is the annual stock return. ROA is the annual return on assets (EBIT/avgAT). Std3RET and Std3ROA represent the three 
year standard deviation of RET and ROA respectively. *** is significant at 1%, ** is significant at 5% and.* is significant at 10% 
 
